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Donald W. Mitchell
It is always satisfying to read a review of your work in which the re­
viewer has understood and addressed with pointed critical analysis some 
of the major points you are trying to make. This is what I found in read­
ing James Fredericks’ very well written, careful and challenging review 
of my Spirituality and Emptiness. In his review, Fredericks has empha­
sized one very central issue which I have explored in some detail in my 
book. I would like in this response to his review to sharpen the issue 
and to answer some of the questions he has raised.
In Spirituality and Emptiness, I have tried to focus on points of simi­
larity between views concerning spirituality held by members of the 
Kyoto School and by spiritual writers within the Christian tradition. I 
have attempted to trace ways in which Christianity can draw on the phi­
losophies and language of the Kyoto School in order to develop a more 
universal, and thus less strictly Western, self-understanding and self­
expression in the field of spirituality. However, in this comparative pro­
cess I have also tried to be careful to explore some of the significant dif­
ferences between both traditions and it is at this point that Fredericks 
raises some very interesting questions.
The particular issue behind many of his questions has to do with 
what he perceives as my sense that neither Kitaro Nishida nor Hajime 
Tanabe have come to grips adequately with either the Christian mysti­
cal experience of God or its theological expression. While there are 
many very positive things that one can learn from both philosophers 
about the nature of ultimate reality and its function in the spiritual life, 
and again I have tried to emphasize these positive contributions to com­
parative religious thought in my book, there is at least one point at 
which their reflections just do not do justice to Christian experience and 
theology. Let me clarify this one point first in relation to Fredericks’ 
review of my treatment of Nishida and then of Tanabe.
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First, in terms of my comparison of Nishida’s philosophical under­
standing of the Buddhist experience of what he terms absolute nothing­
ness and the trinitarian understanding of the Christian mystical 
experience of God, I agree with Fredericks that “Void” is not a proper 
translation of zettai mu. However, I did not use the term “Void” when 
discussing Nishida’s philosophy, but only when discussing Christian 
mysticism which seems to me to be fully appropriate. In fact, I wanted 
to make the point that in presenting the Christian mystical vision, 
I was offering a very different paradigm than Nishida uses to understand 
nothingness in relation to God. This is, I think, a crucial point. I was 
trying to say that when Nishida uses his logic of absolute identity, he 
does so in a way that just does not do justice to the richness and full­
ness of the Christian experience of God. What I have presented in 
response to Nishida is a trinitarian logic that hopefully gives the reader 
a sense of what exactly that richness and fullness entails and how it 
cannot be understood properly in the philosophical paradigm that 
Nishida developed.
In terms of my use of Nishida’s language in presenting Christian 
spiritual theology, had I said that God is the “far side” of the formless 
Void, as Fredericks seems to suggest, I would agree with him that such 
a formulation was indeed “infelicitous.” I have to confess that my use 
of this phrase lends itself to Fredericks’ interpretation. However, the 
kenotic, mystical vision of God that I am exploring does not posit the 
Void as some thing that has a far side. Rather, following such persons 
as Masao Abe, I am suggesting that the Void is an activity, a “creative 
kenosis,” a dynamic “non-being” that is the Ground of being. And 
for a full Christian understanding of this dynamic, one must posit that 
this activity of emptying that is of the essence of God as Love is also at 
the heart of the inner-trinitarian kenosis, what von Balthasar calls the 
“original kenosis” (Ur-kenose), that generates this creative kenosis. By 
“far side” of the creative kenosis or Void, I just mean that for the 
Christian there is a transcendent and personal “self-possession” of 
God, to use Rahner’s term, that does not empty out in the creative ke­
nosis. Thus the transcendent or “far-side” reality of the Trinity eternal­
ly remains the topos of paradise. When I say that Nishida’s paradigm 
cannot account for the “fullness” and “richness” of the Christian mys­
tical experience, I just mean, and have tried to demonstrate in various 
chapters in Spirituality and Emptiness, that it can neither account for
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this far-side trinitarian dimension of the kenosis of God, nor for the 
rich distinctions between the inner-trinitarian kenosis, the creative ke­
nosis, the redemptive kenosis and the sanctifying kenosis of God.
As for Buddhist responses to my position, I would agree with Freder­
icks that Nishida’s philosophy lends itself to “rhetorical strategies” by 
which one could, for example, claim that my notion of the Void is just 
a relative nothingness and not an absolute nothingness. But this would 
be to beg the question. I am questioning the adequacy of Nishida’s 
whole paradigm, in which this distinction is posited, to formulate the 
relation of nothingness to God in the complete Christian sense. What I 
would suggest is that one simply look at the two paradigms that I have 
set side by side in the text. By so doing, I think that it will be clear in 
what ways Nishida’s philosophy based on absolute nothingness cannot 
provide a sufficient basis for comprehending the Christian mystical 
experience of nothingness and God. I am proposing that instead of trying 
to collapse one view into the other, we get clear on this point as we con­
tinue to work together in dialogue toward a deeper and more fruitful 
philosophical-theological encounter.
Fredericks also asks about my views concerning agape based on the 
Christian mystical far-side experience of God, and karuna based on the 
Buddhist experience of the absolute near side. Others have dealt with 
this issue of late. Aloysius Pieris, in his Love Meets Wisdom, points 
out that karuna is not understood to be salvific in itself nor is it direct­
ed toward Ultimate Reality. Karuna is “essentially” directed toward 
all “beings.” Given the perspective of the absolute near side presented 
by Nishida, one would have to agree with Pieris. Unless, of course, one 
wished to posit that given Nishida’s logic of absolute identity, in loving 
beings one is loving Ultimate Reality. However, there is still a differ­
ence here with Christian love. For the Christian, God is the personal 
and relational source of salvific agape, indeed is Agape. And God so un­
derstood is found in the object of one’s love in a manner that reflects 
that love back to God through the person loved. When this love is 
mutual, it even reflects the communal trinitarian life of love and unity 
that is the ultimate source of that love. On the other hand, in my book, 
I have tried to accentuate the great similarities between the Kyoto 
School’s statements about compassion and the Christian notion of 
love. Through the Buddhist emptying out of the distinction between 
self and other in compassion, there is a discovery that true compassion
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is not just a product of the will, but is a self-determination of the Great 
Compassion itself. This is an authentic discovery of compassion in the 
spiritual life about which Christians have a great deal to learn from 
Buddhists.
Now to the second point, namely, my treatment of Tanabe. I should 
like to preface my remarks by pointing out that since a number of 
recent works have dealt with the Zen philosophies of Kitaro Nishida, 
Keiji Nishitani and Masao Abe, I have tried in Spirituality and Empti­
ness to give a more balanced view of the Kyoto School by presenting 
the Pure Land philosophies of both Hajime Tanabe and Yoshinori 
Takeuchi. In this regard, Fredericks asks me about my claim that in 
Christianity one is opened up by grace to something more than the 
transformation process itself. For Tanabe, Other-power (tariki) is the 
force of absolute nothingness in and through the forms of life in 
mutual transformation that ultimately generates “metanoesis” (zange). 
I have tried to show that in Christian spiritual life, one also discovers a 
similar dynamic in the process of metanoesis. And I have suggested, as 
Fredericks points out, that for the Christian the mystical transforma­
tion of life also leads one to find and to manifest God as “Abba.” 
Here, of course, I am drawing on the mystical theology of St. John of 
the Cross.
What, Fredericks asks, is the difference between a Christian mystical 
manifestation of God and Tanabe’s mediation of Other-power? I my­
self would want to compare the manifestation of Abba in Christian 
spiritual life with the “witness” (shO) of Tanabe’s interpretation of 
“action-faith-witness” (gyO-shin-shO). In the latter, such aspects of 
metanoesis as joy and gratitude give witness to its truth. What is wit­
nessed in the mediation of the transformed person is the truth of 
Other-power behind that transformation. I did not mean to imply that 
this is not like grace in Christianity, nor that there is no grace of God in 
this process of action-faith-witness. Certainly the whole force of my 
presentation of Tanabe’s views, and Takeuchi’s in the following chap­
ter, confirms my strong conviction that grace is authentically present in 
the process of what Tanabe calls “death-and-resurrection” and in its 
product of “New Life,” to use again Tanabe’s terms.
However, I did wish to suggest that when Tanabe refers to Other- 
power as acting in him in a manner that obliges him to perform 
metanoia, or as being mediated in a transformed Buddhist life, setting
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aside the phenomena of metanoia or mediation, his understanding of 
the nature of that Other-power is something different from what the 
Christian senses as being manifested in his or her transformed life in 
the spirit of God. It is different in that for the Christian, a trinitarian 
God just does entail something more than what Tanabe understands as 
the force of absolute nothingness itself. I have tried to show what this 
trinitarian “more” is, especially as it is expressed in its social 
mediation/manifestation in the Christian community or the Church. 
So, while I agree with Fredericks that Tanabe’s notion of “absolute 
mediation” has a great deal to teach Christians about the process of 
sanctification, I also feel that the Christian notion of the mystical and 
communal manifestation of a trinitarian God has something to contrib­
ute to the dialogue concerning the nature of the ultimate origin of this 
process.
And so we return to the same issue I raised with Nishida: how are we 
to understand the ultimate origin of the spiritual life (absolute nothing­
ness, absolute mediation and God), in a manner that does justice to the 
deepest experiences of the respective traditions? What I have claimed 
throughout is that today we find ourselves in dialogue together on the 
road to answers to this question. I have tried to show what kinds of 
things Christianity can learn about the spiritual life and its origin from 
the Kyoto School, and I have tried to show that there are certain ways 
in which persons like Nishida and Tanabe have formulated their Bud­
dhist self-understanding that are not yet developed to the point where 
they provide a satisfactory paradigm for a sufficient understanding of 
the Christian mystical experience of God. And I would agree with 
Fredericks’ conclusion concerning the third issue he raises about my 
book, namely, as I pointed out in my response to Takeuchi, it is at the 
point where asceticism and mysticism meet, where will drops off and 
reality awakens, that we should look for answers to the fundamental 
questions about the ultimate ground of spiritual life. For my intention 
is not that my critiques be taken as flat rejections, but as challenges to 
think together through further dialogue along this path of comparative 
theology on to which the Kyoto School has invited us.
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